Pakistan's Sharif backs Iran's missile programme in Tehran visit, calls for end to 'double standards'

Pakistan's Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif used a state visit to Tehran on 23 June 2026 to mount the most explicit public defence of Iran's ballistic-missile programme delivered by a serving head of government since the brief May war between Iran and Israel, telling President Masoud Pezeshkian that 'your happiness is our happiness and your sorrow is our sorrow' and that the world 'cannot digest' a non-proliferation regime that permits missiles for some states and denies them to others.

Sharif's remarks, carried by Iranian state broadcaster PressTV and the Telegram channel Clash Report from 15:59 to 17:15 UTC, recast Pakistan — a nuclear-armed state with its own growing missile inventory — as a diplomatic advocate for Iran's military posture at precisely the moment Tehran is negotiating the architecture of any post-war settlement with Washington. The visit is also the first high-level foreign trip to Iran since the fighting paused, and the choice of Islamabad as first caller carries weight: it tells Tehran who in its neighbourhood is willing to attach reputational costs to defending it.

What Sharif actually said

In comments relayed by PressTV at 16:32 UTC, Sharif addressed Pezeshkian directly: 'Your happiness is our happiness and your sorrow is our sorrow.' A second PressTV post at 16:10 UTC quoted him telling the Iranian president that, 'under your visionary leadership, Iran will transform into one of the fastest-growing economies in the world one day soon.' The diplomatic courtesies were conventional. The substance came in the remarks posted by Clash Report.

At 16:02 UTC, Sharif framed the global non-proliferation regime as discriminatory: 'There cannot be double standards where some countries can have ballistic missiles and Iran should not. You cannot digest this kind of duplicity.' He sharpened the point at 17:15 UTC: 'There are many countries around the globe that stockpile ballistic missiles. So why object to Iran's missiles? This would only create controversy, generating unnecessary delays.' At 16:01 UTC he argued that 'spoilers all over the world' were trying to 'scuttle' a peace deal and 'don't want the Iranian nation, a great nation, to come out of the ashes of war and touch the skies of progress.'

The most consequential line, however, was the one Sharif himself walked back. The Middle East Spectator channel reported at 16:06 UTC that, 'in a shocking statement, Pakistan's Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif claims that Iran has agreed to hold negotiations on its ballistic missile program in the future.' Within minutes, Sharif was denying that any such commitment had been made. The memorandum of understanding signed in Tehran, he said at 15:59 UTC, 'does not mention ballistic missiles. It was never on the table; it was never on the agenda. Iran's side never wanted to even discuss about it.'

Where the contradiction sits

The two statements are not easily reconciled. Sharif's first formulation — that Iran had 'agreed to hold negotiations on its ballistic missile program in the future' — was the kind of formulation that, if confirmed, would have moved markets in Tel Aviv and Washington. His retraction arrived inside the same hour. The likeliest reading is that the Pakistani leader offered the prospect of future talks as a goodwill gesture to a Western audience, was quickly corrected by the Iranian side or his own delegation, and reverted to a posture that mirrors Tehran's own: missiles are not negotiable.

That posture is consistent with the framing Iranian negotiators have used in previous rounds with the United States: that the missile programme is a sovereign capability outside the scope of any nuclear-file agreement. If Sharif's initial language was a slip rather than a coordinated talking point, it points to a deeper problem — the gulf between what Iran's neighbours think Tehran should be willing to discuss and what Tehran itself will put on the table.

What Pakistan gets out of it

The visit is not free for Islamabad. Pakistan is a nuclear-armed state that has expanded its own ballistic-missile inventory in recent years, including the development of longer-range systems that have drawn quiet concern in Washington and New Delhi. By publicly defending Iran's parallel programme, Sharif signals that any future pressure on Pakistani missiles will be met with a coalition of the willing: states that argue, in effect, that the existing non-proliferation architecture is selective in its enforcement.

The timing also matters. The brief May war between Iran and Israel ended without a formal settlement, and the diplomatic question now is who rebuilds the bridge to Tehran first. Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Egypt have all maintained contacts. Pakistan's move — publicly framed as fraternal, civically and culturally bound to Iran 'by centuries of shared history' per Sharif's remarks to Pezeshkian at 17:10 UTC — gives Islamabad an early claim on influence in any post-war regional architecture, and a veto, of sorts, on any settlement that requires Iran to give up its missiles.

Stakes and what remains unresolved

What the visit does not settle is the question of whether Iran's missile programme will feature in any deal with Washington. Iranian negotiators have historically treated the missiles as out of scope. Sharif's retraction aligns with that position. The Middle East Spectator's initial report, by contrast, suggested Islamabad believed otherwise — a divergence that will need to be clarified before any round of talks proceeds.

The other open question is whether Sharif's framing of the non-proliferation regime as discriminatory will land with audiences beyond the region. In Western capitals, the standard counter is that Iran's missile programme is uniquely enmeshed with its nuclear file and its proxy network, and that the comparison with other missile-armed states is therefore inapt. That argument has force. It also has a limit: the more visibly selective the regime's enforcement becomes, the easier it is for states outside the Western security perimeter to make the case Sharif made in Tehran — and the harder it is to hold the line on non-proliferation the next time it is tested.

The sources do not specify the text of the memorandum of understanding signed on 23 June, the duration of Sharif's stay in Tehran, or whether any third-party mediator was present. What is documented is that a serving prime minister used a state visit to argue, on the record, that Iran should keep its missiles — and that the same prime minister, within an hour, retracted the suggestion that Iran had agreed to negotiate them away.

Desk note: Monexus framed Sharif's Tehran visit as a diplomatic alignment event, not a missile-negotiation breakthrough. Wire outlets that picked up the Middle East Spectator line carried it briefly; the Pakistani prime minister's own denial within the hour, also reported in the same Telegram channels, is the more durable record.

Wire provenance

This editorial synthesis draws on the following public wire/social posts:

• https://t.me/ClashReport
• https://t.me/presstv
• https://t.me/Middle_East_Spectator
• https://t.me/presstv
• https://t.me/ClashReport
• https://t.me/ClashReport
• https://t.me/ClashReport
• https://t.me/ClashReport