Iran's IRGC claims a 12-missile barrage on Jordan's Muwaffaq al-Salti Air Base as US widens strikes on Iranian missile sites

Iran's Revolutionary Guard says it fired twelve ballistic missiles at the Muwaffaq al-Salti Air Base in Jordan, claiming hits on locations hosting US F-35, F-15 and F-16 aircraft, as Washington reports new strikes on Iranian missile infrastructure.

By Monexus Staff Writermena5-minute read11 Jun 2026☆ Save ↗ Share ⎙ Print

At 03:15 UTC on 11 June 2026, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps announced that it had launched twelve ballistic missiles at Jordan's Muwaffaq al-Salti Air Base and its associated command centre, claiming the barrage struck locations hosting United States F-35, F-15 and F-16 fighter jets. By 03:46 UTC, Iranian state television was broadcasting images of smoke columns over the base, and by 04:24 UTC open-source intelligence accounts were reporting that surface-to-air missile batteries at the site had begun to launch in response. The same window of the morning brought reports that the United States had conducted fresh strikes on Iranian missile sites and military infrastructure, extending what one OSINT feed described as "a broader military campaign."

What this exchange amounts to is the most direct Iranian strike against a base that hosts US combat aircraft since the 2024 exchanges, and the first publicly claimed IRGC ballistic-missile attack on Jordanian territory. The timing — minutes apart, on the same morning, with US strikes on Iranian missile sites as backdrop — points to a coordinated tit-for-tat rather than two unrelated operations. The pattern is now familiar: an American escalation, an Iranian reciprocal strike, and a widening of the geography of the war from Iranian soil to the territory of a third US partner state.

What Iran said, and what the imagery shows

The IRGC's claim, circulated via Telegram channels carrying its statements and relayed by Liveuamap, was specific: twelve ballistic missiles, two targets (the base and its command centre), and a list of US aircraft types the Guard said had been present. Iranian state broadcaster PressTV posted footage of smoke rising from the airfield, attributing the destruction to the Iranian barrage. By 04:24 UTC, the OSINT-defender feed on Telegram was reporting that surface-to-air missile launches from inside or near the base were visible in the imagery, an indicator that air-defence crews at the site were active in the immediate aftermath of the strike.

Two things are worth separating here. The first is the strike itself: smoke columns, visible launches, and an Iranian claim of hits. The second is the targeting list. Iran is a party to the conflict and has a clear interest in framing the attack as a successful blow against US air power. Independent confirmation of which aircraft, if any, were destroyed, and of damage to runways, fuel storage, or command-and-control nodes, has not yet appeared in the thread. PressTV's footage establishes that something burned at the base; it does not, on its own, establish the operational effect.

The American side: new strikes, broader campaign

The OSINT-defender feed's 04:12 UTC post described recent US strikes on Iran targeting "missile sites and military infrastructure" and explicitly framed the action as "part of a broader military campaign." That phrasing matters. It indicates that Washington does not view the latest round of American action as a discrete retaliation for an isolated Iranian move, but as a continuing operation. The structural implication is that the United States has moved from episodic exchanges to a posture in which sustained strikes on Iranian missile infrastructure are the default mode of pressure.

This is the part of the story that the wire cycle has so far under-weighted. The dominant frame in Western coverage tends to treat each Iranian strike as a discrete provocation and each US response as a measured reply. Read together, the morning's events suggest something closer to an air campaign already in motion, in which Iran's ballistic-missile retaliation is the responder and the United States is the operator setting tempo.

Why Jordan, and why now

Muwaffaq al-Salti is not a symbolic target. It is a Royal Jordanian Air Force base that, like Al-Azraq and Muwaffaq al-Salti's neighbours in the eastern desert, has hosted US Central Command aircraft in past operations against Iranian proxies and, more recently, in the air defence of the region. For Tehran, the political logic of striking a base on Jordanian territory is double: it forces Amman into the public posture of a co-belligerent rather than a bystander hosting US aircraft, and it signals that Iran's missile force is willing to extend the geography of the war beyond Israeli and Iraqi airspace.

For Jordan, the strike is a different kind of problem. Amman has tried throughout the post-2023 period to keep its airspace available to US forces without becoming a target. A successful or even partially successful IRGC ballistic-missile strike on a base inside Jordan changes that arithmetic overnight. The Jordanian government has not, in the material available, yet issued a public response naming the extent of the damage or attributing the attack; the framing will be a test of how directly Amman is willing to be named in the war.

What remains contested, and what comes next

Three things are genuinely uncertain. First, the operational effect of the strike on US and Jordanian aircraft at the base: the Iranian claim, the Iranian state-media footage, and the OSINT observation of surface-to-air launches each point to a real attack, but the open-source material does not yet confirm destroyed aircraft, runway cratering, or radar loss. Second, the trajectory of US escalation: a single morning's strikes on missile sites can be either a discrete retaliation or the leading edge of a longer campaign, and the OSINT feed's language of "broader military campaign" is suggestive rather than conclusive. Third, the question of whether Iran's claim of targeting US fighters is operational reporting aimed at a domestic audience, a deterrent signal to Washington, or both — a question whose answer will depend on whether further strikes on regional airbases follow.

If the trajectory continues, the structural stakes are clear. The war, which for most of 2025 was an air-and-proxy conflict largely contained to Iranian, Iraqi, Israeli and Syrian airspace, would have a second Arab host state inside its targeting envelope. The United States would face a choice between escalation toward a sustained air campaign against Iran's missile force and a diplomatic off-ramp whose preconditions are narrowing. Iran would face the inverse: a window in which its missile force is still large enough to impose costs on regional basing, but one in which American strikes on launchers and infrastructure are degrading that force faster than it can be rebuilt. Jordan, which has so far managed to be an enabler without being a target, would be forced to take a public position on the war inside its own borders.

The story will be in the next twelve hours. If US strikes on Iranian missile infrastructure continue at the same cadence, and if Amman issues a public attribution of the damage at al-Salti to Iran, the morning's events will read in hindsight as the moment a regional air war stopped being containable to the airspace of its principal belligerents. If neither follows, the day's reporting will harden into a stand-off that both sides may prefer to leave rhetorically unresolved.

This article draws on Telegram-sourced open-source intelligence feeds and Iranian state-media reporting; the operational effect of the strike on US aircraft and Jordanian base infrastructure has not been independently confirmed in the materials available at the time of publication.

Wire provenance

This editorial synthesis draws on the following public wire/social posts:

https://t.me/liveuamap/127654
https://t.me/PressTV/433128
https://t.me/OSINTdefender/45021
https://t.me/osintdefender/45022