Iran Releases Footage of IRGC Strikes on US Positions in Eighth Through Tenth Waves of 'Operation Nasr 2'

At 10:44 UTC on 16 July 2026, the Telegram channel @wfwitness circulated footage that Iran's state broadcaster published showing what it described as Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) aerospace offensive operations against US positions in the eighth, ninth and tenth waves of an operation the Iranian side has named "Nasr 2," with the framing stretching across US, Iranian, Jordanian and Kuwaiti flag imagery. Eleven minutes earlier, at 10:33 UTC, the English-language account of Tasnim News, an outlet affiliated with the IRGC, echoed the same announcement: implementation of offensive operations by IRGC Aerospace against American positions in waves eight, nine and ten of Operation Nasr 2.

The clips do not, on their face, corroborate strikes inside Iranian territory or against US assets in any specific Gulf location. They are a release channel's framing of an operation whose targeting and casualty effects cannot be independently verified from the footage alone, and the story therefore turns less on what is shown than on what is claimed, by whom, and through which channels.

What the broadcasts assert

The Tasnim post compresses its claim into a single line: that IRGC Aerospace has executed "offensive operations against American positions in waves 8, 9, and 10" of an operation it names "Nasr 2." The @wfwitness release is the more visual of the two, pairing state-broadcaster footage with a flag stack running the United States, Iran, Jordan and Kuwait, which sits over the geographic band where US forward-deployed forces, logistics hubs and integrated air defence networks have been based in earlier rounds of the post-2023 regional confrontation.

Neither release provides coordinates of individual impacts, weapon-class disaggregation across the three waves, intercept data, or a tally of US or allied casualties. The footage functions as a signalling artefact: a deliberate, datestamped statement that the IRGC intends the operation to be visible on the same day, in the same minute window, across an Iranian state outlet and a witness channel.

Why the channel choice matters

The two Telegram items are not symmetric sources. Tasnim News is the IRGC-affiliated outlet of record in English, and its announcements on Iranian military operations tend to follow the same arc as the Persian-language services inside Iran: a one-line confirmation, imagery attached separately, and a deliberate choice of channel to widen the audience while keeping the official voice clipped. The @wfwitness post is, by contrast, an aggregator account that repackages state-broadcaster material for a transnational Arabic-speaking audience; when it carries Iranian footage of strikes, it is doing the work of distribution, not discovery.

The dual-publication pattern is the newsworthy pattern. A strike claim that lands simultaneously on an IRGC outlet and on a widely followed witness channel, within eleven minutes, in a flag-stacked format that visually compresses Iran's theatre into a single banner, is a communication choice as much as a military one.

The structural frame Tehran is signalling inside

The "Nasr 2" framing has to be read against the prior usage of "True Promise" by the IRGC Aerospace Force for the April 2024 strikes and successor operations. By using a numbered wave counter spanning at least ten rounds, the operation positions each new release as a serial installment in a continuing campaign rather than as a discrete, escalatory event. The structural implication is that Tehran wants the next wave to read as routine, as the expected next chapter, even if the targeting and weapon mix change from round to round.

That is also why the Jordanian and Kuwaiti flags sit next to the American one in the @wfwitness banner. Both countries host US logistics and basing that have been relevant to previous regional operations. Naming them inside the visual frame tells a regional audience that the geographic perimeter of "Nasr 2" extends past US assets in the Gulf proper, into the transit and sustainment architecture that underwrites US reach.

What remains uncorroborated

Independent Western wire reporting on the 16 July waves named in these two Telegram posts is not reflected in the items at hand, and the footage itself does not establish impact locations, weapons used, or specific US-force damage assessments. The dominant framing here is therefore the Iranian one, presented at the moment of release through an IRGC-aligned channel and a witness-channel republisher; the counter-frame, including any denial, intercept confirmation, or damage assessment from US Central Command or from regional capitals, will arrive separately if it arrives at all.

Until that downstream reporting lands, the responsible read is narrow: an Iranian state-aligned announcement that IRGC Aerospace has carried out waves eight, nine and ten of an operation it names "Nasr 2," targeting US positions, with Jordanian and Kuwaiti geography inside the visual framing. The signalling, not the strike packet, is what is verifiable today.

This publication framed the announcement at the level of release: what IRGC-affiliated channels claim, what the visual framing embeds, and what the channel pattern tells us about Tehran's chosen audience. The casualty and intercept ledger will be set by Western wire reporting and by allied defence briefings when they appear.

Wire provenance

This editorial synthesis draws on the following public wire/social posts:

• https://t.me/wfwitness
• https://t.me/tasnimnews_en