Tehran widens the legal perimeter, naming third-party states as potential co-belligerents
Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei tells foreign capitals that enabling US or Israeli military action against Iran is itself an 'act of aggression,' with Tehran reserving the right to respond.

At 09:47 UTC on 24 August 2026, Press TV posted a Foreign Ministry statement in which spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei warned that any country enabling US or Israeli military action against Iran is taking part in an "unlawful act of aggression." The post appeared inside a broader, near-simultaneous messaging push: at 09:36 UTC and again at 09:50 UTC the same outlet carried an English-language line that countries should have no concerns about the Islamic Republic unless they "make their bases, facilities, or equipment" available to forces striking Iran. Read together, the posts are a deliberate widening of Iran's threat perimeter, aimed not at Washington or Jerusalem but at the third-party capitals whose logistics make a future strike package possible.
The Iranian message is the diplomatic scaffolding of a threat, not the threat itself. What is striking is the specificity of the legal category Baghaei is invoking. The 24 August posts identify a class of conduct (enabling, facilitating, hosting) and attach to it the label of aggression. The framing asks foreign capitals to read themselves into the target set before the next round of strikes, not after them.
What Baghaei actually said
The operative English-language formulations come from three Telegram posts published by Press TV on 24 August. The 09:47 UTC post states that any country enabling US or Israeli military action against Iran is "taking part in an unlawful act of aggression," and that Iran will respond to the source of any attack in line with international law. The 09:36 UTC and 09:50 UTC posts carry the parallel line that no country should fear the Islamic Republic unless it makes "bases, facilities, or equipment" available to forces striking Iran. Each of the three posts is a restatement of the same warning in slightly different register; the redundancy is itself a signal that the message is meant to be quotable across wire desks.
A second strand, carried by the Open Source Intel channel at 08:31 UTC, puts a narrower edge on the warning. According to that post, Baghaei described countries participating in US military refuelling operations as committing an "act of aggression" and reserved the right to respond. The same channel, at 09:01 UTC, posted a longer Baghaei formulation: "Iran certainly did not start this war, but we will not allow it to end on the aggressor's terms. Naturally, the aggressor side must be held accountable," the sentence ending where the cited relay ends.
Two cautions follow. First, the Open Source Intel posts are relays of statements originally issued elsewhere; the 08:31 UTC post in the cited thread refers specifically to Bulgaria and Bezmer Air Base, a level of geographic specificity not preserved in the Press TV posts. Readers weighting the geographic scope of the warning should note that the cited evidence names Bezmer Air Base in Bulgaria, and the broader enumeration of jurisdictions that has appeared in some commentary is not contained in the supplied source items. Second, the relay chain matters for certainty. Baghaei's exact wording is being filtered through Press TV (Iranian state media) and through an aggregator channel that mirrors statements from warring parties; a careful reader should weight the verbatim wording accordingly, even where the political shape of the claim is unambiguous.
Why the legal frame matters
The choice of "aggression" as the operative word is the political heart of the message. Monexus analysis: the term does work that ordinary condemnations do not. It converts a permissive act (overflight rights, refuelling, staging, intelligence sharing) into participation in the underlying use of force. Once that conversion is made, the host state's legal exposure is no longer a matter of bilateral diplomacy between Washington and the host capital; it is, on Iran's telling, a matter of international responsibility for the consequences of any strike.
The diplomatic utility of the frame, as Monexus reads the cited statements, is twofold. First, it gives fence-sitting capitals a face-saving reason to refuse US basing or overflight requests without appearing to side with Iran. A government that turns down an American request on "aggression" grounds can present the refusal as a sovereignty decision rather than a political one. Second, it seeds the narrative that any civilian harm from an Iranian retaliatory strike on a third country's facilities is the responsibility of the host state, not of Iran. Whether that argument lands in the chancelleries that matter is a separate question; the argument is now in writing, dated 24 August 2026.
The self-defence counter-formulation
The second half of Baghaei's message is a restatement of Iran's self-defence posture. The 09:01 UTC Open Source Intel post quotes him as saying Iran "certainly did not start this war" and would not allow it to end "on the aggressor's terms," adding that the aggressor side must be held accountable. The structure is the older, sovereignty-grounded one: wars end when the aggressor withdraws, not when the defender capitulates. The Press TV posts complement that line by setting the threshold of "fear": countries have nothing to fear from Iran unless they choose to make themselves available to forces striking it.
This is the framing the Iranian side wants Western wire desks to carry. It positions Iran as the defending party in a conflict it did not choose, and reserves to Tehran the right to define the war's end state. Monexus assessment: the framing has a structural advantage in any forum where sovereignty outranks alliance politics, including the Non-Aligned Movement and segments of the Global South, but it cuts less cleanly in Western coverage, where the Iranian threat itself is treated as a primary regional risk.
What the cited sources do not establish
Three things the cited thread does not contain, and which this article does not assert. First, no specific operational activity is described: there is no mention in the supplied sources of US carrier movements, of an imminent strike on Fordow, or of any current operational posture by US or Israeli forces. The framing of the warning as a response to imminent action is Monexus analysis of timing, not a sourced factual claim. Second, the cited posts do not enumerate which third-party jurisdictions Tehran has in mind; the 08:31 UTC relay names Bezmer Air Base in Bulgaria, and the Press TV posts speak in generic terms about "countries" enabling action. The broader list of potential host states circulating in regional commentary is not contained in the supplied evidence. Third, the relay provenance noted above means the exact wording of Baghaei's longer formulations should be treated as one step removed from a primary Foreign Ministry transcript.
The countervailing read is straightforward and worth stating. Iran is the same state that, in the framing of Western wire coverage and of multiple UN reports over two decades, has armed, funded and directed proxy forces across the region. The "aggressor" label is one Iran applies to others and, in the dominant Western framing, does not readily accept for itself. The cited statements on 24 August are unambiguous on retaliation, and the dominant read that the warnings are the opening of a hotter phase is therefore defensible. The Iranian read, that the warnings are legal notice to bystanders, is also defensible from the same text. Both readings are supported by the same posts. Which one regional governments act on, and which one their publics hear, will determine whether the next 72 hours widen or contain the perimeter Tehran has just drawn.
Desk note: Monexus framed the 24 August warnings as a legal-doctrinal move targeting third-party states, rather than as a threat to Washington and Jerusalem directly. The piece carries the relay provenance of the Open Source Intel posts and restricts geographic claims to what the cited posts actually name.
Wire provenance
This editorial synthesis draws on the following public wire/social posts:
- https://t.me/presstv/203980
- https://t.me/presstv/203978
- https://t.me/presstv/203977
- https://t.me/osintlive/566237
- https://t.me/osintlive/566231